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ABSTRACT 
  The elaborate adjudicatory proceedings set up by the America 
Invents Act of 2011 (AIA) have thrust the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) squarely into the patent-litigation process. The AIA 
proceedings, conducted by the newly formed PTO Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (PTAB), are now a formidable competitor to district 
court litigation. The executive branch has further enhanced PTO and 
PTAB power by vigorously asserting the agency’s prerogatives with 
respect to certain aspects of these proceedings. Despite the formality 
of the AIA proceedings, the agency’s lawyers have steered clear of 
asking for Chevron deference on legal issues decided in these 
proceedings. Although the executive branch’s caution may reflect the 
unusual institutional structure of the PTAB, PTAB decisionmaking 
could be structured in a manner that should, under conventional 
administrative law principles, merit Chevron deference. In all 
likelihood, the chief roadblock to Chevron is not formal 
administrative law but specific challenges within the patent regime. 
Many judges on the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which 
reviews all appeals from PTO decisions, have long been reluctant to 
apply conventional administrative law. Perhaps more surprisingly, the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisionmaking in the area has emphasized 
its own earlier cases (including cases predating the Administrative 
Procedure Act) and stare decisis over conventional administrative 
law. Given potentially hostile courts, the costs of the PTO leadership 
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expending the political capital necessary to embed the PTO more fully 
into the administrative state may exceed the benefits. At best, in those 
cases where stare decisis is not implicated or is on the agency’s side, 
the PTO may be able to exercise indirect influence on the Court 
through the Office of the Solicitor General. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, with considerable fanfare, Congress passed, and 
President Obama signed, the America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA).1 
The AIA, considered by many to be the most significant change to 
the patent system since the Patent Act of 1952,2 heeded the call of a 
broad range of stakeholders to strengthen substantially the powers of 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in reviewing the 
validity of granted patents.3 The various post-grant review 
proceedings set up by the AIA have proved quite popular. The PTO 
(and, more specifically, its newly created Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board (PTAB)) are now an important option for not only any actual 
 
 1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) [hereinafter AIA]. 
 2. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792.  
 3. Entities that had long endorsed post-grant review included the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association (AIPLA). See FED. TRADE COMM’N, Competition Perspectives on 
How Procedures and Presumptions Affect Patent Quality, in TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE 
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 23–24 (2003); COMM. ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., BD. ON SCI., TECH., & 
ECON. POLICY, POLICY & GLOB. AFFAIRS DIV., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L 
ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 95–103 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. 
Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004); AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, AIPLA RESPONSE 
TO THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES REPORT ENTITLED “A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY” 2 (2004). 
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and potential patent defendants but also interested third parties. 
Indeed, the PTAB now receives between one hundred and two 
hundred petitions for invalidity per month.4 Numerous appeals from 
final decisions are making their way to the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit,5 and one case, In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, 
LLC,6 has already reached the Supreme Court. 
In this Article, we assess when, and how, the PTO and its lawyers 
(both at the PTO and at the Department of Justice (DOJ)) have 
chosen to exert administrative power, particularly relative to the 
agency’s immediate reviewing court, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit. As we discuss, because the Federal Circuit was set up 
by Congress in 1982 specifically to review all patent appeals, it has 
long competed with the PTO for preeminence in patent law. The 
complex power dynamic between the PTO and the Federal Circuit 
has already been the subject of considerable scholarship, and the 
creation of the PTAB adds an important new dimension. The 
popularity of the PTAB also creates opportunities for power struggles 
between the agency and certain district courts—most notably (or 
notoriously) the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Texas—that appear quite interested in attracting patent litigation.7 
We find that the executive branch has been relatively assertive in 
certain respects but reticent in others. For example, the PTO has 
aggressively asserted lack of judicial reviewability with respect to the 
agency’s decisions to institute post-grant proceedings, and its final 
decisions on validity have staked out considerable ground in parsing 
the complex requirements of patent validity. But the PTO has not 
structured its decisionmaking in a manner that would put it in the 
strongest position to ask for Chevron deference on legal issues 
decided through adjudication. Indeed, it has not in fact asked for such 
deference. 
In our view, a significant hurdle for the PTO is the Supreme 
Court’s apparent decision to deprioritize administrative law in favor 
of the stare decisis effect of the Court’s cases that predate the rise of 
the modern administrative state. Accordingly, even though 
 
 4. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 
STATISTICS 2–3 (2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-10-31%20 
PTAB. pdf [http://perma.cc/A5T9-DXM5].  
 5. See infra Part I.B. 
 6. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 
U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-446). 
 7. See infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text; infra Part I.A. 
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conventional administrative law doctrine might support the agency, 
the likelihood that the Supreme Court would apply this doctrine is 
too low to overcome costs associated with issuing the types of 
decisions entitled to Chevron deference. At best, in those cases where 
stare decisis is not implicated or is on the agency’s side, the PTO may 
be able to exercise indirect influence on the Court through the Office 
of the Solicitor General (SG). 
Part I of this Article outlines the normative rationale for the 
PTAB, introduces the key proceedings conducted by the PTAB, and 
discusses mechanisms through which the PTAB has asserted power 
relative to the district courts and the Federal Circuit. Part II discusses 
the PTO’s failure to ask for Chevron deference for legal 
determinations made in PTAB adjudications. Part III discusses the 
Supreme Court’s apparent decision to emphasize the stare decisis 
effect of its own prior patent decisions rather than administrative law. 
Part IV outlines a cost-benefit analysis of a PTO decision to set up 
and implement a “Chevron-ready” regime. 
I.  THE PTAB AND POWER ASSERTION 
The AIA restructures many aspects of the patent system, 
including the PTO. With respect to the PTO, the AIA’s most 
important feature is the creation of novel proceedings to review 
granted patents, with the review to be conducted by a new 
adjudicatory body within the PTO, the PTAB.8  
Prior to enactment of the AIA, the major route for correcting 
errors in the initial decision by the PTO to grant a patent was a 
challenge to validity by the defendant after the patent owner brought 
infringement litigation in district court.9 But several interrelated 
arguments favor administrative review of validity over review in 
Article III patent litigation. Perhaps most obviously, Article III 
 
 8. The next four paragraphs rely heavily on Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay 
Kesan, Strategic Decisions by Parties in Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2731002 [https://perma.cc/25WP-DSM5]. 
 9. Pre-AIA mechanisms for adversarial administrative review of granted patents were 
used infrequently and were plagued by delays. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER 
PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA 3 (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/inter_parte_historical_stats_roll_up_EOY2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/6HWG-RC2C] 
(stating that from November 29, 1999 through the abolition of such reexamination effective 
September 30, 2012, fewer than two thousand requests were filed, and that they lasted an 
average of 39.5 months). 
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litigation is quite costly. The biennial economic survey of the 
American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) indicates 
that, even for the lowest-stakes category of patent lawsuits (in which 
less than $1 million was at risk), median litigation costs have risen 
from $650,000 in 2005 to $700,000 in 2013.10 And for the highest-
stakes lawsuits (in which more than $25 million was at risk), median 
litigation costs rose from $4.5 million to $5.5 million over the same 
time period.11 
The high cost of litigation would be less problematic if these 
great expenditures produced accurate interpretation and application 
of the relevant facts and law.12 As standard economic accounts of 
procedure have noted, the goal of procedure is the minimization of 
litigation and error costs.13 But decisions reached in Article III patent 
litigation may not be particularly accurate. Because patent law often 
uses science-based proxies such as “ordinary skill in the art” to tackle 
relevant legal and economic policy goals,14 the subject matter of 
patent law can be highly complex.15 With the possible exception of 
 
 10. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 34 
(2013). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Of course, we do not mean to suggest that a single correct answer will always exist. The 
subject of legal indeterminacy in particular has been the subject of extensive debate among legal 
scholars. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Legal Indeterminacy, 1 LEGAL THEORY 481, 481–85 (1995). But 
in patent law, as in other areas of law, some proportion of factual and legal questions will have 
determinate answers. See id. at 485 (defining an “easy case” as “one in which ‘the facts . . . [of 
the case] fit the core of the pertinent concept-words of the rule in question [with the result that] 
the application of the rule is obvious and unproblematic’”).  
 13. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 
39 J.L. & ECON. 191 (1996) (analyzing the behavioral effects of accurate damage calculations on 
injurers and the injured); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of 
Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1994) (analyzing the social utility of marginal improvements in the 
accuracy of liability determinations). 
 14. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). Thus, for example, under the language of the patent statute, 
securing a patent on an invention requires a showing that the patent would not have been 
“obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” Id. The economic intuition behind this 
inquiry is that if the invention were scientifically or technically obvious to the average scientist 
or engineer working in the field, it would arise even without the incentive of a patent. As the 
Supreme Court has noted, applying the nonobviousness standard correctly requires, among 
other things, that the decisionmaker understand what was contained in the existing relevant 
scientific literature and how the invention differs from what was contained in the literature. See 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14–19 (1966). 
 15. See generally Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to 
Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1068–75 (2003) (discussing the technical 
complexity often involved in applying patent law standards, which “has yielded some 
questionable jurisprudence”).  
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judges on the Federal Circuit, judges in the federal courts tend to be 
generalists who may not have the epistemic orientation necessary to 
tackle questions at the intersection of law, science, and economic 
policy.16 Moreover, district courts have to contend with juries, who 
may be even less equipped than federal judges to address complex 
questions of law and science.17 By contrast, administrative patent 
judges at the PTAB are required to be “persons of competent legal 
knowledge and scientific ability.”18 
Another reason to favor low-cost administrative review, rather 
than high-cost Article III review, is that patent plaintiffs and 
defendants have asymmetric incentives. Asymmetric incentives to 
litigate are built into patent doctrine by the 1971 Supreme Court case, 
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois 
Foundation.19 Under Blonder-Tongue’s view of estoppel, a challenger 
who successfully invalidates a patent eliminates the owner’s ability to 
assert it against anyone.20 Because successful invalidation necessarily 
benefits not only the challenger but also all others affected by the 
patent, including the challenger’s own competitors, commentators 
have persuasively argued that the challenger is providing a public 
good.21 By contrast, the challenger who loses is uniquely estopped 
from challenging the patent again. Although this public good type 
disincentive may exist in the administrative context as well22 (and, 
indeed, exists in certain PTAB proceedings as a consequence of 
strong estoppel provisions established by Congress), the lower cost of 
 
 16. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 4–6 (2010). 
 17. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. 
REV. 1673 (2013).  
 18. AIA § 7, 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012). 
 19. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
 20. See id. at 350 (finding that a patent invalidity finding creates nonmutual defensive 
collateral estoppel, so that a patent that is invalid against one party is invalid against the world). 
 21. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend 
Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent 
Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 952 (2004) (noting the public good problem 
and further arguing that disincentives to challenge may be created in certain situations involving 
oligopolistic competition between licensees that all pay sales-based royalties to the patentee).  
 22. See John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal 
for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 336. But see Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. 
Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn From Administrative Law, 95 
GEO. L.J. 269, 323–28 (2007) (noting that administrative review that relied on Chevron 
deference by the courts rather than estoppel against the patent challenger could substantially 
reduce collective action problems).  
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the administrative proceeding reduces the monetary burden placed 
on the challenger and thus the scale of the disincentive. 
In 2011, these arguments in favor of robust administrative review 
won the day in Congress. The AIA’s statutory language confers 
considerable power to make patent validity determinations on the 
PTO as a whole and on the PTAB in particular.23 The three key post-
grant proceedings set up by the AIA are inter partes review (IPR), 
which allows validity challenges based on novelty and 
nonobviousness; covered business method review (CBMR), which 
allows certain types of business method patents to be challenged on 
any validity ground; and post-grant review (PGR), which allows a 
challenge on any validity ground to patent applications filed after 
March 16, 2013.24 Because PGR has only recently begun to apply to 
granted patents, IPRs and CBMRs are currently the most salient 
proceedings.25 
Each review proceeds in two steps. First, a three-judge panel of 
the PTAB, generally selected with an eye to expertise in the area of 
science or technology involved, decides whether the petition shows 
either a “reasonable likelihood” that at least one challenged claim 
would be invalid (in the case of an IPR)26 or that “it is more likely 
than not” that at least one challenged claim would be invalid (in the 
case of a CBMR).27 If the panel concludes that the petition meets the 
relevant threshold, the panel institutes review. After institution of 
review, the panel must generally make the final decision on the 
patent’s validity within one year.28 
Although questions of infringement are still decided in the 
courts, an invalidity finding in the context of PTAB proceedings 
renders the infringement question moot. Moreover, if a PTAB panel 
finds a patent claim valid, such a decision requires a prior legal 
determination regarding the scope of the patent (so-called patent 
 
 23. See infra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.  
 24. AIA § 6(a) (providing for IPR); id. § 18 (providing for CBMR under the Transitional 
Program for Covered Business Method Patents); id. § 6(d) (providing for PGR).  
 25. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 4, at 3 (showing that three or 
fewer PGR petitions were filed monthly).  
 26. AIA § 6(a), 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012). 
 27. Id. § 6(d), 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2012). 
 28. Id. § 6(a), (d), 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(11), 326(a)(11) (2012).  
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“claim construction”)29 that should be relevant to judicial 
infringement findings.30 
Both the PTO and the PTAB have embraced the power 
conferred by Congress. In the remainder of this Part we discuss 
administrative-power assertion relative to district courts as well as 
power assertion relative to the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit. Historically, the main power struggle has been between the 
PTO and the Federal Circuit. In recent years, however, as many 
commentators have observed, district courts appear to be competing 
to attract patent litigation.31 The most notable (or notorious) example 
is the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, which 
some argue has deliberately instituted overly plaintiff-friendly 
procedures to attract patent disputes.32 
A. Power Relative to the District Courts 
Statutory features that make the PTAB more attractive than 
district courts for challenging patents have the effect of significantly 
enhancing PTAB power.33 Perhaps most notably, from the standpoint 
of a patent challenger, the AIA’s “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard for invalidating granted patent claims in post-grant 
 
 29. See, e.g., Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, 135 S. Ct. 831, 837–39 (2015) (discussing 
the tenets of patent claim construction). 
 30. That said, as discussed further below, see infra note 39 and accompanying text, to the 
extent the PTAB uses a claim construction standard that differs from that used in Article III 
courts, district courts may be reluctant to rely on the PTAB claim construction. 
 31. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 
631, 634–36 (2015); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1466 n.139 
(2010); Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016) (manuscript at 49–50), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2538857 [https://perma.cc/MJ7E-
NDC9].  
 32. Anderson, supra note 31, at 632–33. 
 33. Of course, enhancing PTAB power by making it an attractive venue to challenge 
patents could be viewed as diminishing the power of another institution within the PTO—the 
examining corps. Indeed, prior to the PTAB’s having issued many decisions, some 
commentators had expressed concern that, out of solidarity with the examining corps and 
concern for overall PTO prestige, the PTAB might be reluctant to cancel claims on granted 
patents. See, e.g., Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron 
Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 2013–14 (2013). At least thus far, 
Wasserman’s concerns have not been borne out. More generally, large agencies like the PTO 
are highly complex organizations, with potentially conflicting internal constituencies. 
Administrative law scholars have recently begun to pay significant attention to important 
divisions within agencies. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking 
Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316–18 (2006); Elizabeth 
Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1036–38 
(2011). 
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administrative reviews is more attractive (because easier to satisfy) 
than the “clear and convincing evidence” standard used in Article III 
courts.34 
The AIA also directs the PTO to establish a cadre of expert 
administrative judges who are required to process validity challenges 
to granted patents in a short period of time (generally a year after the 
initial institution).35 Expertise, resources, and quick decisionmaking 
are valuable for the PTAB not only in absolute terms but also 
because they enhance the case for district court stays of parallel 
litigation. The AIA also delegates significant rulemaking power over 
details of post-grant proceedings to the PTO. Specifically, for each of 
the key post-grant proceedings, the PTO Director must prescribe 
regulations “establishing and governing” the proceedings.36 This 
delegation creates the potential for additional power transfer. So long 
as PTO regulations do not contradict specific statutory language,37 
these regulations are constrained only by the requirement that they 
reflect such high-level principles as “the effect of any such regulation 
on the economy, the integrity of the patent system, the efficient 
administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office to timely 
complete proceedings.”38 
Pursuant to this Congressional authorization, the PTO has 
implemented regulations that have the effect of transferring power to 
the PTAB. In certain cases, rules create power by making the 
proceedings attractive to challengers. For example, PTO rules 
 
 34. Compare AIA § 6(d), 35 U.S.C. § 326(e) (2012) (requiring the statutory 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard), with Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 
2238, 2242 (2011) (holding that challengers to granted patents must show “clear and convincing 
evidence” of invalidity in Article III courts). 
 35. See AIA § 7, 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012); AIA § 6(a), (d), 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(11), 
326(a)(11) (2012). 
 36. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(2)–(4), 326(a)(2)–(4); see also AIA § 18, 35 U.S.C. § 321 note 
(2012) (providing that the director “shall issue regulations establishing and implementing a 
transitional post-grant review proceeding for review of the validity of covered business method 
patents”).  
 37. Under conventional administrative law principles, when Congress delegates regulatory 
power to agencies, the agency cannot issue regulations in contravention of clear statutory 
language. See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
In the case of the PGR sections of the AIA, certain statutory language is quite specific and 
clear. For example, either party to a proceeding has a “right to an oral hearing.” 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 316(a)(10), 326(a)(10). But the statute also employs terms that broaden the regulatory 
authority of the PTO, such as “what is otherwise necessary in the interest of justice.” Id. 
§ 316(a)(5)(B). 
 38. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(b), 326(b). 
BENJAMIN & RAI IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/2016  9:48 AM 
1572 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1563 
invoking an approach to claim scope known as “broadest reasonable 
interpretation” (BRI) in the three proceedings creates greater 
potential for claim invalidity than in district court.39 The agency’s 
decision to allow preliminary institutions of review and final decisions 
to be made by the same panel of judges may also enhance 
attractiveness to challengers—on this view, judges who have already 
decided to institute review are likely to find for the challenger.40 
To be sure, district courts are hardly passive actors in these 
power dynamics. For PTAB petitioning to be most effective, the 
district court must be open to staying concurrent litigation. In this 
regard, the AIA language is not as strong as it could be. Although the 
AIA does specifically direct district courts to use a standard that 
favors grants of stay in CBMR proceedings,41 the statute provides no 
such direction for IPR proceedings.42 
Nonetheless, in general, district courts have been reluctant to 
deny stay motions. In the period since PTAB proceedings began in 
 
 39. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1276–78 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-446); see also infra notes 51–62 and 
accompanying text.  
 40. Of course, this situation has parallels in Article III litigation. A judge who has decided 
to grant a preliminary injunction, for example, may be inclined to make a final ruling in favor of 
the party that secured the preliminary injunction. See Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-in Effect of 
Preliminary Injunctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 779, 800–02 (2015).  
 41. AIA § 18(b)(2). For purposes of “ensur[ing] consistent application of established 
precedent,” the AIA also provides for immediate interlocutory appeal of the district court’s 
decision regarding CBMR stays. Id. 
 42. The statute’s more aggressive allocation of power to the PTAB in the context of 
CBMR proceedings may reflect a view, held by influential members of the enacting Congress, 
that CBMRs encompass subject matter that should be outside the scope of patent protection in 
the first place. This view was held by Senators Schumer and Kyl, who proposed a version of the 
CBMR provision as part of a floor managers’ amendment on March 1, 2011. In his March 2011 
Senate floor testimony, Senator Schumer described business method patents as “the bane of the 
patent world” and castigated the Federal Circuit’s decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (1998), to allow such patents. 157 Cong. Rec. 
3386, 3416 (2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer). Among many senators on the Republican side, 
positions were equally strong. The Senate Republican Policy Committee’s summary of section 
18, introduced into the Congressional Record by Senator Kyl, stated (somewhat inaccurately) 
that 
[r]ecent court decisions, culminating in last year’s Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. 
Kappos, have sharply pulled back on the patenting of business methods, emphasizing 
that these “inventions” are too abstract to be patentable. In the intervening years, 
however, PTO was forced to issue a large number of business-method patents, many 
or possibly all of which are no longer valid. The Schumer proceeding offers a 
relatively cheap alternative to civil litigation for challenging these patents, and will 
reduce the burden on the courts of dealing with the backwash of invalid business-
method patents.  
Id. at 3420 (statement of Sen. Kyl).  
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September 2012 through the end of May 2015, district courts have 
permanently denied in full only 25.6 percent of stay motions pending 
IPR and only 20.6 percent of stay motions pending CBMR.43 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s 2014 decision in VirtualAgility Inc. v. 
Salesforce.com, Inc.44 states that district courts have very limited 
discretion to deny stays when all claims asserted in litigation are also 
under CBMR.45 
B. Power Relative to the Federal Circuit 
Litigating at the Federal Circuit, the PTO has asserted power 
relative to the appellate court in at least three major respects. First, 
the agency has argued that it is entitled to Chevron deference for a 
number of rules governing post-grant proceedings. These include 
rules that designate the BRI standard for claim construction,46 that 
allow decisions regarding preliminary institution of review and final 
decisions to be made by the same panel,47 and that allow the PTAB to 
institute a review on only some of the claims in the petition.48 Second, 
the agency has asserted that the AIA effectively insulates the PTAB’s 
preliminary institution of review decisions from judicial review, even 
when the PTAB’s final decision on the merits is later appealed.49 
Third, the agency has asserted its prerogative to define the scope of a 
CBMR proceeding and has also pushed the envelope in evaluating 
challenges to patent-eligible subject matter within those 
proceedings.50 
 
 43. Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 8 (manuscript at 29). 
 44. VirtualAgility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  
 45. Id. at 1313 (“Under the statutory scheme, district courts have no role in reviewing the 
PTAB’s determinations regarding the patentability of claims that are subject to CBM 
proceedings.”). 
 46. See, e.g., In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-446) (“Because Congress authorized the 
PTO to prescribe regulations, the validity of the regulation is analyzed according to the familiar 
Chevron framework.”); see also infra Part II (discussing cases invoking Chevron).  
 47. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023, 1029–30 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 48. Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., Nos. 2014-1516, 2014-1530, 2016 WL 520236, 
at *2–3 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 2016). 
 49. See, e.g., Brief for Intervenor–Director of U.S. Patent & Trademark Office at 13, 
Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 2014-1194) (citing 
35 U.S.C. § 324(e) to argue that the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction to review the PTO 
Director’s decision to institute a PGR).  
 50. AIA § 18(a)(1), 35 U.S.C. § 321 note (2012) (“[T]he Director . . . shall issue regulations 
establishing and implementing a transitional post-grant review proceeding for review of the 
validity of covered business method patents.”).  
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The PTO has repeatedly claimed Chevron deference for its rules 
governing post-grant proceedings. In the first decision by the Federal 
Circuit regarding a patent claim cancellation rendered under the 
proceedings (in that case in an IPR), the PTO argued that its 
rulemaking position on claim construction was entitled to the strong 
deference available under Chevron.51 The Federal Circuit’s 2015 
majority opinion in the case, In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, 
LLC,52 agreed in part with the PTO. In its decision, the Federal 
Circuit emphasized the PTO’s longstanding use of BRI in both pre-
grant and post-grant proceedings prior to the AIA, noted that 
Congress is presumed to legislate against the backdrop of such 
convention, and stated that Congress implicitly approved BRI in the 
AIA.53 But the court also discussed the new rulemaking authority the 
AIA conferred on the PTO and concluded that, even if Congress did 
not approve BRI in the AIA, the PTO’s rule adopting BRI was 
reasonable under step two of Chevron.54 Similarly, the Federal Circuit 
has relied on reasonableness under Chevron step two as an 
alternative ground for supporting PTO positions regarding the 
composition of institution panels55 and the selection of claims for 
institution.56  
One aspect of the BRI controversy, over whether the agency’s 
rulemaking regarding BRI represents “substantive” rulemaking and 
thus exceeds its power, echoes prior controversies in which the PTO 
has been challenged for allegedly exceeding its rulemaking power. 
Most notably, in the 2009 case Tafas v. Kappos,57 the PTO faced a 
challenge over proposed rules limiting the ability of applicants to 
refile rejected patent applications as many times as they wanted.58 In 
that case, as in the BRI case, the challenger argued that the PTO’s 
rulemaking authority was purely procedural, with the term 
“procedural” defined very narrowly.59 In response to the challenge, 
 
 51. Cuozzo Speed Techs., 793 F.3d at 1279.  
 52. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 
U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-446).  
 53. Id. at 1277–78. 
 54. Id. at 1278–79.  
 55. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 56. Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., Nos. 2014-1516, 2014-1530, 2016 WL 520236, 
at *5 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 2016). 
 57. Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 58. Id. at 1371.  
 59. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee Triantafyllos Tafas at 17, Tafas, 586 F.3d 1369 (arguing that 
the PTO lacks statutory authority to promulgate substantive rules); Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee 
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the agency capitulated, and ultimately withdrew the rules limiting 
refiling.60 Given the recent background of the Tafas case, the agency’s 
willingness to argue that broad rulemaking authority allows it to take 
an unpopular stance suggests some level of comfort in asserting 
power.61 In fact, in its brief (unsuccessfully) opposing certiorari in the 
Cuozzo case, the government argued that “nothing in the AIA’s 
delegation of rulemaking authority limits the agency to ‘procedural’ 
rules.”62 
Second, in Cuozzo and other cases, the PTO has asserted that 
the plain language of the AIA prohibits judicial review of PTO 
decisions to institute post-grant proceedings, even when the agency’s 
final patent validity decision is challenged on appeal.63 Like its 
position on BRI, the PTO’s strong position against judicial review is 
quite controversial. Indeed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on 
both the judicial review issue and the BRI question.64 
Third, the agency has been quite assertive with respect to the 
highly contested issue of what constitutes a covered business method 
(CBM) subject to CBMR and what constitutes patent-eligible subject 
matter within these reviews. Section 18(d)(1) of the AIA defines a 
CBM patent as “a patent that claims a method or corresponding 
apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in 
the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or 
service, except that the term does not include patents for 
 
GlaxoSmithKline at 14, Tafas, 586 F.3d 1369 (same). According to the challengers, procedural 
rules were limited to those rules that had no impact on the ability to secure patent rights. See, 
e.g., Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee Triantafyllos Tafas, supra, at 22–25. 
 60. Dennis Crouch, USPTO Removes Rule Changes, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 14, 2009), http://
patentlyo.com/patent/2009/10/uspto-removes-rule-changes.html [http://perma.cc/YC77-V3SQ].  
 61. In this Article, we do not take on the question of whether the BRI standard is the best 
approach or even reasonable under step two of Chevron. Although the Congressional desire for 
IPR and CBMR to serve as a substitute for Article III litigation, see supra notes 23–24 and 
accompanying text, might militate in favor of the PTAB using the same claim construction 
standard as district courts, Congress sent mixed signals by also providing an explicit statutory 
mechanism for amending claims. AIA § 6(a), 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(1)(B) (2012). 
 62. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 15, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, No. 
15-446 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2015), 2015 WL 8621635, at *15. 
 63. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 
U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-446). Technically, the Cuozzo court’s decision on 
this aspect of the case was limited to IPRs. Id. But the statutory language on which the court 
relied is identical to that which applies to CBMRs and PGRs.  
 64. Id. at 1299 (reporting that five of the eleven judges on the Federal Circuit dissented 
from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc). 
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technological inventions.”65 Section 18 also directs the PTO to issue 
regulations that define the term “technological invention.”66 The 
relevant legislative history shows that Senators Schumer and Kyl (the 
sponsors of the CBMR provision) faced opposition to a broad reading 
of the term “covered business method.”67 
Even so, the PTO has adopted not only a relatively broad 
definition but also a definition that gives the agency a fair amount of 
discretion. PTO rules promulgated pursuant to its section 18 
rulemaking authority to define the “technological invention” 
exclusion state that the agency will consider on a case-by-case basis 
“whether the claimed subject matter as a whole recites a 
technological feature that is novel and unobvious over the prior art; 
and solves a technical problem using a technical solution.”68 
The PTO has also taken an active stance on the question of what 
constitutes a “financial product or service” under section 18. Even 
though Congress did not specifically order the PTO to promulgate 
regulations, the PTO proceeded to promulgate a regulation restating 
the language of the statute.69 In response, the agency received 
comments stating that it should clarify that the term “financial 
product or service” was limited to the products developed by the 
financial services industry.70 The PTO rejected this proposed 
clarification. In doing so, the agency invoked Senator Schumer’s 
 
 65. AIA § 18(d)(1), 35 U.S.C. § 321 note (2012) (Transitional Program for Covered 
Business Method Patent); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a) (2014). 
 66. AIA § 18(d)(2); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b). 
 67. As discussed earlier, see supra note 42, Senators Schumer and Kyl were very opposed 
to business method patents. The views of Senator Schumer and Kyl were not shared by all those 
who voted for section 18, however. Other Senate and House members who discussed section 18 
(both in support and in opposition) suggested that it would apply only to patents related to the 
financial industry, as contrasted with business methods more generally. 157 CONG. REC. S9078 
(daily ed. June 14, 2011) (reproducing a Chamber of Commerce letter, read into the record by 
Senator Leahy, stating that CBMR provided “a tailored pilot program which would allow patent 
office experts to help the court review the validity of certain business method patents using the 
best available prior art as an alternative to costly litigation” (emphasis added)). In subsequent 
floor commentary delivered in September 2011, immediately before the AIA’s passage 
(commentary ultimately adopted by the PTO in its rulemaking), Senator Schumer was slightly 
more modest, stating that section 18 was intended to cover activities “financial in nature, 
incidental to a financial activity or complementary to a financial activity.” 157 CONG. REC. 
S5432 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer).  
 68. 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b). 
 69. Id. § 42.301(a). 
 70. Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents—Definitions of Covered 
Business Method Patents and Technological Innovation, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,734, 48,735–36 (Aug. 
14, 2012).  
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September 2011 floor statement that the CBMR proceeding broadly 
encompassed patents claiming activities “that are financial in nature, 
incidental to a financial activity or complementary to a financial 
activity.”71 
Within CBMR proceedings, the PTAB has also been aggressive, 
particularly with respect to its interpretation of section 101. The first 
CBMR proceeding appealed to the Federal Circuit, Versata 
Development Group, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc.,72 involved a PTAB 
decision to institute a review proceeding over objections by Versata 
that its patent, which covered methods and apparatus for pricing 
consumer products and services, was not a CBM patent.73 After 
instituting the case, the PTAB then took an assertive stance on the 
substance, rejecting the relevant claims as ineligible subject matter 
under section 101 of the patent statute.74 The PTAB decision was 
rendered on June 11, 2013,75 about one month after the Federal 
Circuit’s famously fractured decision en banc in the patent eligibility 
case of CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty Ltd.76 and well 
before any Supreme Court consideration of the case. 
Essentially ignoring the Federal Circuit,77 PTAB Lead 
Administrative Judge Michael Tierney’s decision relied heavily on 
two Supreme Court decisions that promote an aggressive view of 
section 101 limitations—Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc.78 and Gottschalk v. Benson.79 The decision cited 
Prometheus for the proposition that a claim covering an abstract idea 
is patent eligible only if it adds “significantly more” to the abstract 
idea.80 Applying this Prometheus proposition to the case before it, the 
PTAB determined that “determining a price using organizational and 
 
 71. Id. at 48,735 (citing 157 CONG. REC. S5432 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. 
Schumer)).  
 72. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 73. Id. at 1311–13. 
 74. Id. at 1313. 
 75. SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., No. CBM2012-00001, 2013 WL 3167735 
(P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013).  
 76. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 77. The panel cites the Federal Circuit’s fractured en banc opinion in Alice Corp. only for 
the proposition that “the Federal Circuit has recognized that it has been especially difficult to 
apply § 101 properly in the context of computer-implemented inventions.” SAP Am., Inc., 2013 
WL 3167735, at *14.  
 78. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 79. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 80. SAP Am., Inc., 2013 WL 3167735, at *14. 
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product group hierarchies” is an abstract idea.81 It then cited 
Gottschalk v. Benson for the proposition that implementation on a 
general purpose computer did not add “significantly more” to the 
abstract idea.82 
Similarly, the government brief in Versata on appeal to the 
Federal Circuit—filed in May 2014, more than a month before the 
Supreme Court had offered any opinion about section 101 issues in 
the Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International83 appeal—
emphasized that the addition of a general purpose computer to an 
abstract idea does not make the abstract idea patent eligible.84 The 
brief also emphasized that a claim could be abstract even if the claim 
were “highly specific.”85 For the latter proposition, the brief cited two 
sources of support: Prometheus’s view that the “law of nature” 
exception to patentability does not depend on the level of specificity 
at which the relevant natural law is stated, and the fact that the 
Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos86 had deemed claims to be abstract 
ideas even though they were drawn to very specific methods of 
hedging against risk in energy markets.87 
As it happens, the PTAB opinion and the executive branch brief 
were strikingly in line with the subsequent Supreme Court decision in 
Alice. At the time, however, the approach the Supreme Court would 
take was far from clear. 
Throughout the Versata litigation, the PTO also defended its 
prerogative to define what constitutes a CBM. With respect to the 
CBM definition, the executive branch88 aggressively rejected 
Versata’s claim that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction even to 
review the PTAB’s determination regarding what constitutes a 
CBM.89 The government highlighted the section of the AIA stating 
 
 81. Id. at *16. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 84. Brief for Intervenor–Director of U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 49, at 51. 
 85. Id. at 52. 
 86. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 87. Brief for Intervenor–Director of U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 49, at 52.  
 88. Tellingly, the brief was filed by both the PTO and the DOJ’s Civil Appellate Division, 
and a DOJ lawyer argued the case. See id. at 55. At the Federal Circuit level, DOJ lawyers 
typically get involved when important executive power and administrative law questions are at 
stake.  
 89. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting 
that the “USPTO devotes a substantial part of its brief to the argument that this court lacks 
jurisdiction to review the Director’s decision to institute a post-grant review”). 
BENJAMIN & RAI IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/2016  9:48 AM 
2016] THE ERA OF PATENT STARE DECISIS 1579 
that PTO Director determinations regarding whether to institute 
CBMRs are “final and nonappealable.”90 It argued that 
nonappealability applies not only to the issue of whether the 
petitioner has made a threshold showing that “at least 1 of the claims 
challenged in the petition is unpatentable” but also to the definition 
of a CBM patent.91 
Additionally, the government’s brief in Versata, invoking 
administrative law principles of deference, argued that affirmance of 
the PTAB’s determination was proper even if the Federal Circuit 
were to determine it had jurisdiction.92 With respect to the PTAB 
determination that the Versata patent was a “financial product or 
service,” the government argued this determination was not arbitrary 
or capricious under section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).93 As for the PTAB’s determination that the 
Versata patent did not involve “technological invention,” the 
government invoked the Auer v. Robbins94 principle that an agency 
interpretation of its own regulations should be upheld unless the 
interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent.95 Specifically, 
according to the PTO, because the Versata patent employed a 
computer only for generic functions, the agency’s determination that 
the patent was a CBM met the deferential Auer standard.96 
At the Federal Circuit, the government’s arguments in Versata 
were controversial, and some of them were rejected. The majority 
opinion, authored by Judge Plager, rejected the government’s view 
that the AIA cut off judicial review of a PTAB decision to institute 
 
 90. Brief for Intervenor–Director of U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 49, at 24.  
 91. See id. at 16 (discussing the PTO’s argument). 
 92. Id. at 12, 51–52.  
 93. Id. at 25. The government may have been disinclined to argue for the stronger form of 
deference provided by Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997), because the PTO’s actual 
regulation with respect to what constituted a “financial product or service” merely restated the 
language of the statute. Although Auer deference may apply even in that circumstance, use of 
Auer under those conditions has been criticized by both scholars and judges. See Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2006) (holding that “the near equivalence of [a] statute and 
regulation belies the Government’s argument for Auer deference”). Interestingly, the patent 
challenger, SAP, went further than the government, arguing that the PTO position was entitled 
to deference under step two of Chevron.  
 94. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 95. Id. at 461. 
 96. Brief for Intervenor–Director of U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 49, at 28. 
(citing the Supreme Court decision in Auer for the proposition that agency interpretation of a 
regulatory definition is “controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation”).  
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review.97 Rather, he categorized the PTAB’s decision to institute a 
CBMR as part of the ultimate invalidation inquiry made by the 
PTAB, and noted that the AIA clearly gave the Federal Circuit 
reviewing authority over the ultimate invalidation inquiry.98 Although 
Judge Plager’s argument has vulnerabilities—as Judge Hughes noted 
in his partial dissent, whether a patent is invalid is quite different 
from the question of whether a particular institution has authority to 
determine invalidity99—the PTO’s muscular argument about 
unreviewability certainly pushes against the broad presumption of 
judicial review of agency action.100 This reviewability question is now 
before the Supreme Court in the Cuozzo case. 
The majority opinion in Versata did, however, agree with the 
PTO’s position that the Versata patent represented a CBM.101 
Additionally, it embraced the principle of “substantial” deference to 
the PTO’s definition of “covered business method,” noting 
Congress’s “broad delegation of rulemaking authority in the 
establishment and implementation” of CBMR proceedings.102 
Unfortunately, because the opinion did not precisely specify which 
regime of “substantial” deference it was invoking, its value for future 
decisionmaking by the Federal Circuit is not as robust as it could have 
been. 
Given the PTO’s invocation of administrative law in discussing 
PTO control over CBMR coverage and its assertive actions in 
interpreting section 101, the government’s failure to ask for any 
deference for this interpretation of section 101 is perhaps surprising. 
Similarly, in IPR appeals, the PTO has not asked for deference on its 
legal determinations with respect to novelty or nonobviousness.103 As 
discussed in Part II, the PTO has not asked for deference despite a 
plausible argument that PTAB post-grant proceedings represent 
formal adjudications. Thus, under the Supreme Court decision in 
 
 97. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1319–20 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 98. Id. at 1320–22. 
 99. Id. at 1337–43 (Hughes, J., dissenting in part).  
 100. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (stating that only “clear and 
convincing evidence” can overcome the presumption of judicial review of agency action). 
 101. Versata, 793 F.3d at 1325. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Our research has found that, as of September 2015, the Federal Circuit has rendered 
decisions from appeals of twenty-five final written decisions of the PTAB. To our knowledge, 
the PTO has not asked for deference on legal issues concerning validity in any of these appeals. 
Memorandum from Elliot Chen to Arti Rai (Sept. 21, 2015) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
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United States v. Mead Corp.,104 legal determinations made by the 
agency in at least some portion of these reviews are entitled to 
Chevron deference.105 
The agency’s failure to ask for Chevron deference on questions 
of validity, or indeed on any legal determinations made in 
adjudication (as contrasted with earlier rulemaking), is also puzzling 
to the extent that the PTAB has been active not only in the area of 
section 101 but also with respect to other important questions of 
validity. As Rochelle Dreyfuss has recently argued, the PTAB’s 
decisionmaking provides important suggestions for filling in gaps left 
by the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit on such central validity 
questions as the definiteness requirement and nonobviousness.106 
II.  FAILURE TO ASK FOR CHEVRON DEFERENCE ON LEGAL 
DETERMINATIONS MADE IN ADJUDICATION 
As the previous Part highlights, the PTO has sought to assert 
significant authority under the auspices of the AIA. This assertion of 
authority has sometimes included taking a leadership position on the 
legal standards that determine patent validity. So it might seem 
obvious that the PTO would argue for Chevron deference on these 
positions. But it has not so argued. 
The most obvious explanation, and the one presented by John 
Golden in this Symposium,107 is that the AIA does not give the PTAB 
the authority to act with the force of law, so no type of PTAB 
adjudicatory decision can receive Chevron deference.108 We disagree. 
Mead held that Chevron deference applies when Congress gives 
agencies authority to make decisions carrying the force of law, and 
the agency acts on that authority.109 According to the Court, 
“[d]elegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as 
by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-
 
 104. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
 105. See infra Part II.  
 106. See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its 
Money: Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235 (2015) (reviewing 
recent CBMR, IPR, and PGR decisions and proposing ways of resolving the problems that have 
arisen under the new AIA procedures).  
 107. John Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J. 1655 
(2016).  
 108. See generally id. (arguing that PTAB can still exert significant influence over patent law 
despite not receiving Chevron deference under the AIA). 
 109. Mead, 553 U.S. at 226–27.  
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comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable 
congressional intent.”110 Mead elaborated: 
It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates 
administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a 
relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the 
fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of 
such force. Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases applying 
Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking or formal adjudication.111 
Mead emphasized that the touchstone is not whether an agency 
specifically utilizes the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures 
laid out in section 553 of the APA or the formal adjudication 
procedures laid out in sections 556 and 557 of the APA, but rather 
whether agency processes have sufficient formality and rigor to give 
them the “force of law.”112 Indeed, in a footnote following the 
sentence quoted above, some of the adjudications Mead listed as 
constituting formal adjudications did not meet all the requirements 
that apply to formal adjudications under the APA.113 Accordingly, the 
standard enunciated by Mead indicates that courts should consider 
not whether a given adjudication has every element of the procedural 
formality required under sections 556 and 557,114 but whether the 
agency is conducting a procedure that is roughly comparable in rigor. 
The PTAB decisionmaking processes meet this standard. They 
have a fair amount of formality and rigor. The statute creating the 
PTAB requires oral hearings, one of the hallmarks of formality.115 
Indeed, the PTAB statute goes beyond sections 556 and 557 by 
requiring discovery.116 And the PTO’s implementation of the statute 
adds to the rigor—for example, by prohibiting ex parte 
 
 110. Id. at 227. 
 111. Id. at 230.  
 112. Id. at 226–27. 
 113. Id. at 230 n.12; see Golden, supra note 107, at 1669–70.  
 114. The APA requires, inter alia, that there be a presiding officer (ALJ) who is relatively 
independent of the agency and who has general control of the proceeding. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) 
(2012). Parties are entitled to present evidence, present rebuttals, and cross examine. See id. 
§ 556(d). And the ALJ’s decision must be based on the record. See id. § 556(e). The agency must 
put its case into evidence and subject it to scrutiny, and the ALJ may not go beyond the record 
in making its final decision. Id. 
 115. See AIA § 6(a), (d), 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(10), 326(a)(10) (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) 
(providing for oral hearings); Benjamin & Rai, supra note 22, at 298. 
 116. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(5), 326(a)(5); 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–57 (2012) (not requiring 
discovery). 
BENJAMIN & RAI IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/2016  9:48 AM 
2016] THE ERA OF PATENT STARE DECISIS 1583 
communications with PTAB judges and providing for cross 
examination.117 Furthermore, as Melissa Wasserman has noted, the 
statute’s “legislative history clearly shows that Congress understood 
the Act to ‘convert[] inter partes reexamination from an 
examinational to an adjudicative proceeding’ while establishing a new 
procedure known as postgrant review that ‘would take place in a 
court-like proceeding.’”118 The bottom line is that IPRs, CBMs, and 
PGRs—the three PTAB procedures with which this Article is 
concerned—have the indicia of rigor and formality that should satisfy 
Mead’s “force of law” inquiry.119 
That said, for purposes of Chevron deference, formality and rigor 
are necessary, but they may not be sufficient. A full analysis must also 
consider whether an agency head needs to be involved. 
In most agencies, formal adjudications are conducted by 
administrative law judges (ALJs), and the ALJs’ determinations are 
reviewable by agency heads.120 The ALJs find facts, make legal 
determinations, and render decisions.121 The norm is that an ALJ’s 
decision becomes the decision of the agency unless the agency head 
reviews the decision and takes further action.122 
By contrast, as Golden notes, the underlying agency decisions at 
issue in the cases Mead cited as examples of formal adjudication 
 
 117. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.5 (2012) (prohibiting ex parte communications); id. § 41.157 
(providing for cross-examination). 
 118. Wasserman, supra note 33, at 1983. 
 119. In a predecessor bill, Congress did decide to delete a provision that would have given 
plenary rulemaking authority to the PTO. But in our view that 2007 decision is largely 
orthogonal to whether legal determinations made in the case-by-case PTAB decisionmaking 
established by the AIA could have the force of law under Mead.  
 120. See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133–34 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation ALJs are not officers because they do not render final 
decisions); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: 
An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1489–90 (2009) 
(discussing review of ALJs’ decisions). 
 121. See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 120, at 1478 (explaining that ALJs 
“handle matters in many areas of concern to citizens and society” and “adjudicate massive 
numbers of individual disputes”).  
 122. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012) (“When the presiding employee makes an initial decision, 
that decision then becomes the decision of the agency without further proceedings unless there 
is an appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency within time provided by rule.”); see also 29 
U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012) (stating that an NLRB judge hearing evidence “shall issue . . . a proposed 
report, together with a recommended order” which will become the order of the NLRB and 
effective if no parties file exceptions within the statutory time period); infra notes 129–35 
(discussing cases involving agencies in which decisionmaking is not reviewed by the agency 
head). 
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entitled to Chevron deference were affirmative decisions made by 
agency heads.123 The agency heads made the final agency decision, 
and that decision was appealed to the federal courts.124 
But these citations in Mead do not answer the question of 
whether only adjudications overseen by agency heads and/or treated 
as precedential by the agency are entitled to Chevron deference. The 
touchstone is the “force of law” inquiry under Mead.125 Mead did not 
address the question of what, if any, involvement by an agency head 
or binding effect on the agency is necessary for an adjudication to 
have the force of law. And the Supreme Court has not addressed 
these questions in any subsequent case. 
Tom Merrill and Kristin Hickman have argued for a fairly high 
bar: “An adjudicatory order should be understood to have the ‘force 
of law’ . . . only if it is legally binding both inside the agency (that is, 
binding on other agency personnel) and outside the agency (that is, 
binding on the parties to the adjudication).”126 Thus, they suggest that 
only decisions made or overseen by agency heads, and treated as 
binding by the agency, are entitled to Chevron deference.127 Cass 
Sunstein, by contrast, has suggested that adjudications that are 
binding on the parties (as virtually all adjudications are) have the 
force of law and thus are entitled to Chevron deference under 
Mead.128 
These dueling interpretations of Mead are mirrored in a circuit 
split on this question. In Olson v. Federal Mine Safety & Health 
Review Commission,129 the Tenth Circuit, relying on Merrill and 
Hickman and the agency’s rules (which provided that “[a]n 
unreviewed decision of [an ALJ] is not a precedent binding upon the 
Commission”),130 held that an ALJ’s decision was not entitled to 
 
 123. See Golden, supra note 107, at 1670–71. 
 124. Id.  
 125. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); see supra note 112 and 
accompanying text. 
 126. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 908 
(2001). 
 127. Id.  
 128. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 222 (2006) (“[A]n agency 
decision may be taken to have the ‘force of law’ when it is binding on private parties in the sense 
that those who act in violation of the decision face immediate sanctions.”); see also Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 
1488–90 (2005) (suggesting that an agency’s “practical adherence” to a position is sufficient). 
 129. Olson v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 381 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 130. Id. at 1014 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 2700.72). 
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Chevron deference “because the Commission did not review the 
ALJ’s decision, and the decision is therefore not binding precedent 
under the Commission’s rules.”131 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held 
that the dispositive question is whether the agency “‘intended to issue 
an interpretation’ of a statute it enforces,”132 looking to whether the 
head of an agency indicates that the administrative judge’s decision 
(there, an immigration judge) creates a precedent for the agency.133 
And in another case involving the decision of an immigration judge, 
the Second Circuit concluded that a summary affirmance of an 
immigration judge’s opinion did not “contain[] the sort of 
authoritative and considered statutory construction that Chevron 
deference was designed to honor.”134 By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit 
in Florida Medical Center of Clearwater, Inc. v. Sebelius afforded 
Chevron deference to an ALJ decision that was not subject to higher-
level review.135 
Consistent with the position of Merrill and Hickman, as well as 
the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, Golden argues that ordinary 
PTAB decisions that are not reviewed by the PTO Director do not 
receive Chevron deference.136 Golden’s view has some merit. 
Although only about one-third of the total cohort of more than 250 
PTAB judges hear post-grant trials, that fraction still encompasses 
more than eighty judges.137 These judges, who serve on panels of 
three, receive, and must make decisions on, approximately 150 
petitions per month.138 To some extent, PTAB procedures resemble 
the sort of uncoordinated decisionmaking process that Mead 
identified as an indicator of decisions that lack the force of law. In 
Mead, the scale of decisionmaking and lack of coordination were 
more extreme: “[T]o claim that classifications have legal force is to 
ignore the reality that 46 different Customs offices issue 10,000 to 
15,000 of them each year. Any suggestion that rulings intended to 
have the force of law are being churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hernandez v. 
Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 839 n.13 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 133. See Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 134. Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 189–91 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 135. Fla. Med. Ctr. of Clearwater, Inc. v. Sebelius, 614 F.3d 1276, 1280–81 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 136. Golden, supra note 107, at 1663. 
 137. PTAB, State of the Board Presentation on Allocation of Duties Among Judges (Jan. 11, 
2016) (slide on file with authors). 
 138. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 4, at 3. 
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at an agency’s 46 scattered offices is simply self-refuting.”139 Mead’s 
reasoning that Chevron deference is not warranted for the actions of 
many different units not supervised by the agency head supports the 
proposition that Chevron deference is inapplicable to routine PTAB 
decisions that are not specifically supervised by the PTO Director. 
But that is not the end of the story. The PTO has promulgated 
guidelines for designating selected PTAB opinions as precedential 
and explicitly binding on the PTO.140 The PTO’s guidelines provide 
that any PTAB judge, the Director, the Deputy Director, the 
Commissioner for Patents, or the Commissioner for Trademarks can 
nominate a PTAB opinion to be designated as precedential.141 If the 
chief judge considers the opinion an appropriate candidate for 
designation as precedential, PTAB judges can then vote on the 
question.142 Even if a majority votes in favor, however, the Director’s 
agreement is also required.143 
This process would seem to satisfy the more demanding of the 
two interpretations of Mead outlined above. The agency has created a 
process by which PTAB opinions are precedential and binding, and 
the process entails the explicit agreement of the agency head. 
Notably, the PTO could change the guidelines in ways that would 
make the fit under Mead even stronger. Specifically, the guidelines 
could be revamped to require a rehearing leading to a precedential 
opinion. A rehearing would bring in an additional source of legal 
authority for the guidelines give greater authority to the Director, and 
ensure that the PTO was in fact crafting a new decision (even if, in 
cases in which the Director agreed with the original decision, it bore a 
strong resemblance to the original one).  
The proffered legal authority for the existing guidelines states 
that the Director “has an interest in providing policy direction and in 
creating binding norms for fair and efficient patent examination” 
 
 139. United States v. Mead Corp., 553 U.S. 218, 223 (2001) (citations omitted). 
 140. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 2 (REVISION 9) PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS AND 
DESIGNATION OF OPINIONS AS PRECEDENTIAL, at pt. III(E), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/sop2-revision-9-dated-9-22-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/RCM6-6JAH] 
(laying out procedures for the designation of PTAB opinions as precedential, and providing that 
“[a] precedential opinion is binding authority in subsequent matters involving similar facts or 
issues”). 
 141. Id. pt. II. 
 142. Id. pt. III.  
 143. Id. pt. III(D) (“No opinion may be precedential without concurrency by the 
Director.”). 
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under 35 U.S.C. §§ 2(b)(2) and 3(a)(2)(A).144 The latter provision is 
more relevant, as it provides that “[t]he Director shall be responsible 
for providing policy direction and management supervision for the 
Office and for the issuance of patents and the registration of 
trademarks.”145 But nothing in either provision explicitly gives the 
Director authority to make opinions precedential. Such authority is 
only implicit in § 3(a)(2)(A) making the Director responsible for 
policy direction for the PTO. 
By contrast, the patent statute explicitly grants the Director 
authority to rehear PTAB decisions, and such rehearing authority 
more obviously encompasses the ability to treat reheard cases as 
precedential. Title 35, section 6 of the U.S. Code provides that “[t]he 
[PTO] Director, the Deputy Director, the Commissioner for Patents, 
the Commissioner for Trademarks, and the administrative patent 
judges shall constitute the Patent Trial and Appeal Board,”146 and that 
“[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter 
partes review shall be heard by at least three members of the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board, who shall be designated by the 
Director . . . [and] [o]nly the Patent Trial and Appeal Board may 
grant rehearings.”147 
What sort of authority does this provision entail for the 
Director? In answering this question, we are not drawing on a blank 
slate. The Federal Circuit considered this precise question in In re 
Alappat.148 This was a pre-PTAB case, and the relevant language 
referred to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences instead of 
the PTAB.149 However, except for the substitution of “Patent Trial 
and Appeal Board” for “Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences” 
(and the more lofty title of “Director” now given to the PTO head), 
the language quoted above from 35 U.S.C. § 6 is identical to the 
relevant language in Alappat.150 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 146. Id. § 6(a). 
 147. Id. § 6(c). 
 148. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 149. See id. at 1531. 
 150. From Alappat: 
In this case, the composition of the Board and its authority to reconsider its own 
decisions, and the Commissioner’s authority over the Board, are governed by 35 
U.S.C. § 7, which reads: 
(a) The examiners-in-chief shall be persons of competent legal knowledge 
and scientific ability, who shall be appointed to the competitive service. 
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Alappat held that this language permitted the Director to review 
any Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences decision by creating 
an expanded panel that consisted of the original panel plus the 
Director and her top lieutenants listed in the statute.151 In Alappat, the 
Director created an expanded panel consisting of the original three 
panel members plus five new members (the Director, her deputy, an 
assistant, and the chair and vice-chair of the board).152 These five 
officials voted together to reverse the decision of the now-minority 
three original panel members.153 The lead opinion in Alappat 
concluded that the procedure employed by the Director was 
consistent with the statutory language.154 
To be sure, this is less control than would exist if the statute flatly 
stated that the Director could individually review any PTAB decision 
on her own initiative. But by changing the guidelines to focus on 
rehearings and by relying on 35 U.S.C. § 6, the Director could give 
herself greater control over PTAB decisions, both by being able to 
rehear decisions (good and bad) and by creating an expanded panel 
with like-minded agency officials. In other words, the Director has the 
effective ability to accept, modify, or reject panel decisions. 
In Alappat, the patent applicant raised a due process objection to 
the procedure employed by the PTO.155 Although the objection was 
untimely and the Federal Circuit opinion did not address it, we are 
skeptical that interpreting the statute to give the agency head the 
effective ability to review decisions poses a due process concern. To 
the contrary, the Director’s ability to exercise legal and policy control 
over decisions by ALJs is part of what Ronald Levin has called the 
 
The Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant 
Commissioners, and the examiners-in-chief shall constitute the Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences. 
(b) The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences shall, on written appeal 
of an applicant, review adverse decisions of examiners upon applications 
for patents and shall determine priority and patentability of invention in 
interferences declared under section 135(a) of this title. Each appeal and 
interference shall be heard by at least three members of the Board of 
Appeals and Interferences, who shall be designated by the Commissioner. 
Only the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences has the authority to 
grant rehearings. 
35 U.S.C. § 7 (1988) (emphasis added). 
Id. 
 151. Id. at 1531–32. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. at 1531–32. 
 155. Id. at 1536. 
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“standard federal model.”156 Under this model, the agency head has to 
be the final arbiter of legal and policy questions at the agency, and 
therefore decisions by ALJs must always be reviewable by agency 
heads.157 
As evidence of the Director’s lack of authority, Golden cites 35 
U.S.C. § 141, which provides for appeal of a PTAB decision to the 
Federal Circuit.158 In fact, section 141 also provides a right to appeal 
to patent owners and applicants, but not to the Director.159 Depriving 
the Director of the authority to appeal would be a startling omission 
if the Director had no other way of controlling PTAB outcomes. But, 
as Alappat noted, this omission seems premised upon the Director’s 
authority to effectively review PTAB decisions.160 
With all that said, the most striking developments are the dogs 
that have not barked. Thus far, the PTO has utilized its existing 
authority to declare PTAB opinions precedential in only three 
cases.161 Moreover, the decisions declared precedential in those cases 
all revolve around questions of institution of post-grant proceedings, 
which may be unreviewable in any event.162 This failure to declare 
opinions precedential occurs despite complaints by the patent bar 
that PTAB panel opinions on a number of issues are inconsistent.163 
 
 156. Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Judges and Agency Policy Development: The Koch 
Way, 22 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 407, 412 (2013). 
 157. See id. at 413 (“Models in which administrative judges’ decisions may not be reviewed 
by agency heads have been widely criticized in the literature.”). 
 158. Golden, supra note 107, at 1667. 
 159. 35 U.S.C. § 141(a) (2012). 
 160. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1535: 
One also should not overlook the asymmetry of § 141, which grants 
applicants, but not the Commissioner, the right to appeal a decision of the 
Board to this court. Since Congress has reenacted § 141 several times since 
the 1927 debates about the Board’s independence, it is safe to infer that 
Congress believed the Commissioner did not need a right of appeal in view 
of his limited control over the Board pursuant to § 7 and in view of his 
rulemaking authority pursuant to § 6(a). 
(citation omitted). The powers to which the court refers in sections 6 and 7 are now contained in 
sections 2, 3, and 6. 
 161. LG Elecs. Inc. v. Mondis Tech., Ltd., IPR-2015-00937, 2015 WL 9699396 (P.T.A.B. 
Sept. 17, 2015); Westlake Servs. LLC v. Credit Acceptance Corp., CBM-2014-00176, 2015 WL 
9699417 (P.T.A.B. May 14, 2015); SecureBuy LLC v. CardinalCommerce Corp., No. CBM2014-
00035, 2014 WL 1691559 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 25, 2014). 
 162. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012); see also supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
 163. See, e.g., Scott McKeown, PTAB Expanded Panels Are Not by Party Request, PATENTS 
POST-GRANT (May 11, 2015), http://www.patentspostgrant.com/ptab-expanded-panels-are-not-
by-request [https://perma.cc/JHA6-XEPG] (“[G]iven the number of decisions issuing from the 
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As for rehearing, although the PTAB has had rehearings and has 
constituted expanded panels in some circumstances, the Director has 
not utilized her rehearing authority for purposes of serving on a panel 
and thus providing a decisive PTO determination.164 This inaction 
occurs despite patent bar complaints regarding a dearth of 
precedential opinions. And it persists even though declaring an 
opinion precedential or conducting a rehearing or both would seem to 
satisfy the more stringent requirements for adjudications to have the 
force of law and thus be entitled to Chevron deference. The tools for 
greater PTAB consistency and for Chevron deference, in other words, 
are in the Director’s hands. 
In our view, the limit to the Director using these tools is not 
formal administrative law as such, but a combination of two factors: 
the need to expend political capital in generating Chevron-ready 
opinions combined with the possibility that neither the Federal 
Circuit nor the Supreme Court will be receptive to arguments for 
Chevron deference. We discuss potential political costs associated 
with generating precedential opinions in Part IV. We turn next to the 
apparent limits of administrative law within the patent system. 
III.  THE (APPARENT) LIMITS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
In 2007, we wrote an article entitled Who’s Afraid of the APA?: 
What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law,165 noting 
that the Federal Circuit had not applied ordinary administrative 
principles to patent law.166 In that article, we highlighted a 1999 
Supreme Court case, Dickinson v. Zurko,167 in which the Court held 
(contrary to the Federal Circuit) that the PTO was an agency subject 
to review under the standards of the APA.168 We noted that despite 
Zurko, the Federal Circuit largely adhered to its long tradition of 
ignoring administrative law.169 
Since that time (as the discussion in Part I suggests), many judges 
on the Federal Circuit have continued to be relatively wary of 
 
PTAB, and the lack of precedential value accorded to the overwhelming majority of them, it is 
becoming increasingly common to see directly conflicting opinions on legal issues such as 
privity, real-party-in-interest, evidentiary issues, etc.”). 
 164. See id. (discussing expanded panels that do not include the Director). 
 165. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 22. 
 166. Id. at 284. 
 167. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
 168. Id. at 152, 161. 
 169. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 22, at 299–301. 
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administrative law.170 Perhaps more notably, the Supreme Court has 
been similarly wary. The Supreme Court’s wariness is striking not 
only given Zurko, but also given developments in other areas that 
some courts had treated as subject to a special regime—most notably, 
tax law. For many years, a longstanding jurisprudence treated tax law 
as an exception to ordinary deference principles, particularly in light 
of National Muffler Dealers Association v. United States,171 a pre-
Chevron case in which the Supreme Court had articulated a lower 
level of deference to IRS legal determinations.172 But in the 2011 case 
of Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United 
States,173 the Court squarely held that Chevron applied to tax 
regulations.174 More generally, we now see significant momentum in 
favor of applying ordinary principles of administrative law to tax 
law.175  
Zurko and Mayo Foundation notwithstanding, recent Supreme 
Court opinions in the patent arena have tended to reject standard 
administrative law principles. These opinions have instead given 
precedence to a forceful reading of the Court’s own pre-APA cases. 
Thus, for example, in its 2011 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership176 
decision, the Supreme Court unanimously held that challenges to 
PTO patent grants had to prove invalidity by clear and convincing 
evidence.177 According to the Court, the 1952 patent statute, which 
simply states that a granted patent shall be “presumed valid,” in fact 
 
 170. That said, the partial embrace of deference by the panels in Cuozzo and Versata, see 
supra notes 54, 102, is notable. 
 171. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979). 
 172. Id. at 477; see Mark E. Berg, Judicial Deference to Tax Regulations: A Reconsideration 
in Light of National Cable, Swallows Holding, and Other Developments, 61 TAX LAW. 481, 492–
93 (2008) (describing the Court’s post-National Muffler jurisprudence); Kristin E. Hickman, The 
Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 
1540 (2006) (noting that several experts on tax law have argued that Chevron deference should 
not apply to Treasury regulations, based on “a belief that the tax area has its own, unique 
deference tradition represented principally by the Court’s pre-Chevron opinion in National 
Muffler Dealers Association v. Commissioner”). 
 173. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011). 
 174. Id. at 55–56. Notably, the Court’s opinion in Mayo Foundation relied heavily on 
Dickinson v. Zurko. See id. at 55. 
 175. Indeed, two years ago the Duke Law Journal’s Administrative Law Symposium was 
devoted to this very topic. See Amandeep S. Grewal, Taking Administrative Law to Tax, 63 
DUKE L.J. 1625, 1625–26 (2014); see generally Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher Walker, The 
Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 221 (2014) (arguing that the Tax Court 
should apply ordinary administrative law principles to its review of the IRS). 
 176. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
 177. Id. at 2242.  
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codifies a 1934 Court statement in Radio Corp. of America v. Radio 
Engineering Laboratories, Inc. (RCA)178 that clear and convincing 
evidence is needed to overturn an issued patent.179 Moreover, because 
of Justice Cardozo’s suggestion in RCA that clear and convincing 
evidence was necessary even when the evidence before the court was 
“different, at least in form,” from evidence before the PTO, the Court 
in i4i held that clear and convincing evidence is necessary even when 
the challenger brings forward evidence not before the PTO.180 
To our knowledge, however, although the legislative history does 
talk about codifying an “existing presumption of validity,”181 it does 
not cite RCA or provide any indication regarding the specific 
quantum of evidence that the challenger must provide. Moreover, 
although the Court in i4i states that the term “presumed valid” has a 
“settled meaning in the common law,”182 and uses RCA as the basis 
for this settled meaning, settled meaning may differ depending on the 
Supreme Court cases to which one looks. As we noted in our 2007 
article, many Court cases prior to the APA and since the APA have 
enunciated the boilerplate view that the actions of all administrative 
agencies are “presumptively valid.”183 
To be sure, in i4i, the SG—whom the Court often consults in 
patent cases184—submitted an amicus brief arguing strenuously that 
Congress had codified RCA.185 The SG may have done so because 
RCA offered a more bright-line defense of the past actions of the 
PTO than the standard, APA-based approach. As we argued in 2007, 
standard APA review would have counseled deference to the PTO 
(probably under an arbitrary and capricious standard) only when the 
evidence introduced in litigation had previously been presented to the 
 
 178. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1 (1934). 
 179. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2243 (relying almost exclusively on a close reading of RCA).  
 180. Id. at 2245–46, 2249–51 (citing RCA, 293 U.S. at 8). 
 181. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 29 (1952). 
 182. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2245.  
 183. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 22, at 281 n.53 (quoting Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 
U.S. 86, 101 (1949)). 
 184. See generally John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 538 (2010) (tracing the increasing influence of the SG’s Office on 
the Court’s patent jurisprudence since 1994, and noting that “[s]ince 2000, the Solicitor General 
has enjoyed not only an expanded ability to help in selecting patent cases for Supreme Court 
review but also an incredible winning streak in getting the Supreme Court to adopt its legal 
positions in patent cases”). 
 185. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 8–17, 
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-290).  
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PTO.186 When evidence had not been presented to the PTO, there 
would have been no prior PTO review to which the court could 
defer.187 By contrast, the SG’s argument—largely adopted by the 
Court—was a bright-line statement regarding the need for clear and 
convincing evidence that was more likely to yield decisions to uphold 
the patent.188 
But even in cases in which the SG has emphasized standard 
administrative law, the Court has demurred. For example, in Kappos 
v. Hyatt189 (a case in which the PTO was the petitioner), the SG’s brief 
argued forcefully that standard principles of administrative 
exhaustion and of deference to agency expertise precluded 
introducing evidence in a patent applicant’s district court challenge to 
a PTO patent denial that could reasonably have been presented to 
the PTO previously.190 The Court specifically rejected the claim that 
“background principles of administrative law govern the admissibility 
of new evidence.”191 It relied instead on a 1884 Supreme Court case, 
Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe,192 in which the Court had 
suggested that the relevant provision of the patent statute established 
proceedings independent from the PTO.193 The Court stressed 
Butterworth even as it acknowledged another case, Morgan v. 
Daniels,194 decided just ten years later, in which the Court had stressed 
the expertise of the PTO as a reason to defer to the agency in 
rejecting the disappointed applicant’s arguments.195 
Of course, the reason that the Supreme Court is able to cite old 
precedent is because the patent statute—and judicial interpretation 
thereof—predates the rise of the modern administrative state.196 
 
 186. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 22, at 319. 
 187. See id. 
 188. See Brief for Petitioner at 26–28, Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012) (No. 10-1219).  
 189. Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012). 
 190. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 188, at 12–13.  
 191. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. at 1696. 
 192. Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50 (1884). 
 193. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. at 1698.  
 194. Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120 (1894). 
 195. See Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. at 1698–99.  
 196. The rise of the modern administrative state is generally dated to the implementation of 
the New Deal in the 1930s, or perhaps the Progressive Era and the New Deal, but either way 
many decades after the Patent Act of 1836 created the Patent Office. See, e.g., William E. 
Forbath, Radicalism and the Modern State: A Critique of Republican Nostalgia, 21 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 121, 121 (2011) (“The Progressive Era and the New Deal were the decades that 
witnessed the creation of the modern administrative state in the United States.”); Gillian E. 
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Moreover, under section 559 of the APA, the statute does “not limit 
or repeal additional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise 
recognized by law.”197 In Zurko, the Court held that pre-APA judicial 
precedent (in that case, precedent regarding the standard of review 
applicable to review of PTO fact-finding) was not sufficiently clearly 
established to prevent application of the APA.198 Since that time, 
however, the Court appears to have found clear pre-APA precedent 
that contradicts traditional principles of administrative law. 
A call for Chevron deference for substantive legal 
determinations by the PTAB could entail a substantial departure 
from the emphasis on stare decisis implicit in i4i and Hyatt. Indeed, to 
the extent that the Court’s holding regarding Chevron deference in 
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Services199 applies, administrative interpretations of the patent statute 
could trump prior judicial interpretations unless those prior judicial 
determinations held that the interpretation in question was the only 
permissible one. Many commentators have recognized that, under 
Brand X, deference trumps stare decisis.200 
Of course, i4i and Hyatt are only two cases, and they only 
implicitly suggest that the Court will always be convinced of the clear 
stare decisis effect of its own pre-APA decisions. In its 2015 decision 
in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC,201 however, the Court made 
explicit its very muscular view of the role of stare decisis in patent 
law. In Kimble, the Supreme Court declined to overrule Brulotte v. 
 
Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The Evolving Relationship Between 
Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 129 (2015) 
(stating that “administrative law and financial regulation were conjoined in the New Deal’s 
creation of the modern administrative state”); Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the 
Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference With the Judiciary’s Structural 
Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 66 (2000) (observing that the role of administrative agencies “changed 
dramatically with the rise of the modern administrative state and its expansion during the New 
Deal”).  
 197. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012). 
 198. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155–59 (1999). 
 199. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 200. For example, Kathryn Watts has made this precise point in an article heading. See 
Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 997, 
1013 (2007) (“Brand X: Allowing Chevron to Trump Stare Decisis”); see also Richard Murphy, 
The Brand X Constitution, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1247, 1292 (“[The] duel between Chevron 
deference and stare decisis arrived at the Supreme Court in 2005 in National Cable & 
Telecommunication Association v. Brand X Internet Services, and the Court chose deference.”). 
 201. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015). 
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Thys Co.,202 a 1964 case that had rejected licensing agreements that 
levied royalties after the expiration of the patent as per se unlawful.203 
The petitioner in Kimble had argued that the economic foundations 
of Brulotte had been undermined and thus that it should be 
overruled.204 The majority rejected that argument, holding that it 
would not overrule Brulotte.205 
What is particularly interesting for our purposes is the degree to 
which the Court viewed patent law as being relatively immune to the 
possibility of evolution outside Congress. For example, Kimble 
explicitly rejected the antitrust comparison: 
   If Brulotte were an antitrust rather than a patent case, we might 
answer [the] questions as Kimble would like. This Court has viewed 
stare decisis as having less-than-usual force in cases involving the 
Sherman Act . . . . But Brulotte is a patent rather than an antitrust 
case, and our answers to [the] questions instead go against Kimble. 
To begin, even assuming that Brulotte relied on an economic 
misjudgment, Congress is the right entity to fix it. By contrast with 
the Sherman Act, the patent laws do not turn over exceptional law-
shaping authority to the courts. Accordingly, statutory stare decisis—
in which this Court interprets and Congress decides whether to 
amend—retains its usual strong force.206 
Notably, as Justice Alito observed in dissent, Brulotte “made 
little pretense of finding support for [its] holding in the language of 
the [Patent] Act.”207 The Patent Act had no language regarding 
postexpiration patent royalties, yet Brulotte held that such royalties 
were per se unlawful.208 
 
 202. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964). 
 203. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2407–08, 2415.  
 204. Brief for Petitioners at 36–40, Kimble v. Marvel Enters., LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) 
(No. 13-720).  
 205. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2405. In doing so, the Supreme Court did follow the 
recommendation of the SG. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Kimble v. Marvel Enters., LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720). 
That is, as with i4i, the Court agreed with the SG’s view that the Court should rely on its own 
precedents. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415; Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 
(2011). As we noted above, however, the Court rejected a contrary argument by the SG in 
Hyatt. See Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1694 (2012). In other words, the common thread in 
these cases is the Supreme Court relying on its precedents, not deference to the SG. 
 206. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412–13 (citations omitted). 
 207. Id. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 208. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964). 
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IV.  PTO POWER ASSERTION: A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
In this Article we have focused on two phenomena: the PTO’s 
failure to place itself in the strongest position for receiving Chevron 
deference, and the Supreme Court’s frequent reliance on pre-APA 
cases that it views as definitively deciding the meaning of the current 
patent statute. 
With respect to the former, the PTO has underutilized the tools 
at its disposal. Although the PTO already has guidelines for 
designating PTAB opinions as precedential, it rarely uses those 
guidelines. Moreover, the PTO has not established guidelines that 
provide the Director maximum ability to review a PTAB decision and 
oversee the final result. The benefits of such intensive involvement 
are obvious with respect to PTAB decisions with which the Director 
disagrees. And even for PTAB decisions with which she agrees, 
formal administrative law would indicate that the extra steps involved 
in making opinions precedential, in ordering rehearing, or doing both, 
significantly increases the chance that the resulting decision will 
receive Chevron deference. 
For its part, the Supreme Court has in cases like i4i and Hyatt 
failed to apply traditional administrative law doctrine. Instead, it has 
adhered to opinions decided not only before the enactment of the 
APA but also, in the i4i case, under an earlier version of the relevant 
patent statute. 
We believe PTO behavior is connected, at least in part, to the 
Supreme Court’s approach. To probe further the contours of the 
relationship, we posit three components of a PTO (and executive 
branch) cost-benefit analysis on the question of Chevron deference: 
the cost of setting up a Chevron-ready regime and implementing it in 
any given case, the increase in the chance of receiving Chevron 
deference, and the benefit of Chevron deference applying. 
The costs of setting up a Chevron-ready regime vary to some 
extent depending on whether the PTO wants to invoke its existing 
system for designating PTAB decisions as precedential or do more. 
Even within the existing system, the greatly expanded size of the 
PTAB makes securing the requisite majority agreement of all judges 
(including judges who do not handle post-grant proceedings) a 
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challenge.209 By the same token, changing current voting requirements 
to streamline the voting process entails its own costs, in terms of the 
time and energy involved in such a change. If the Director wants to 
give herself a greater role, and perhaps further strengthen the 
argument for Chevron deference, the costs might be even greater. 
Their precise magnitude will depend on the extent to which the 
Director believes she will have to expend political capital in crafting 
new guidelines.210 
We turn next to the increase in the chance of receiving Chevron 
deference. There are three possibilities with respect to implementing 
the existing guidelines, or modifying them to encompass rehearings: 
first, any such implementation or modification could be unnecessary, 
because ordinary PTAB decisions will receive Chevron deference; 
second, it could be dispositive, because ordinary PTAB decisions will 
not receive Chevron deference but those designated as precedential 
or rehearings overseen by the Director will receive Chevron 
deference; or, third, it could be legally meaningless, because neither 
ordinary PTAB decisions, PTAB decisions designated as 
precedential, nor post-rehearing opinions will receive Chevron 
deference. Of course, reasonable minds can differ, but as a matter of 
legal doctrine (and as we discussed in Part II) we think that the 
second possibility is quite likely. 
From the standpoint of the PTO, however, conventional 
administrative doctrine is not the dispositive consideration. Instead, 
the agency and its lawyers (both at the PTO and the DOJ) must take 
note of the Supreme Court’s recent lack of interest (and the Federal 
Circuit’s longstanding lack of interest) in applying conventional 
administrative law principles in the patent context. The problem may 
be particularly acute with respect to Chevron. And on questions of 
Chevron, it appears that patent law may not be the only outlier. The 
empirical work of William Eskridge and Lauren Baer suggests that 
 
 209. McKeown, supra note 163 (noting that precedential opinions are “next to impossible 
given the requirement of a majority vote of all APJs, including those that are outside of the 
Trial Section”). 
 210. As we noted earlier, supra note 33, internal divisions within an agency can be quite 
significant. The costs of implementation of review by the PTO leadership should be relatively 
low. The PTO leadership presumably already engages in some review of important PTAB 
decisions as part and parcel of the Director’s leadership of the PTO. As in any organization, a 
key role for the leader is to review the decisions of subordinates for conformity with what she 
determines to be the organization’s goals. If rehearing were part of the Director’s review, this 
rehearing could be translated into a new opinion fairly expeditiously, especially if the new 
opinion agreed with, and thus built upon, the decision it replaced. 
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the Supreme Court often fails to apply Chevron in many areas of 
substantive law, even in the standard circumstance in which the 
organic statute gives the agency rulemaking authority and the agency 
interprets a statute under the auspices of this authority.211 
That brings us to the third component—the benefit of Chevron 
deference. Full consideration of the actual impact of Chevron on the 
deference accorded to agencies is beyond the scope of this (and 
perhaps any) Article, but it bears noting that recent empirical work 
on the impact of Chevron at the Supreme Court is not encouraging. 
The empirical work of Eskridge and Baer suggests that, at the 
Supreme Court, win rates under Chevron are lower than win rates 
under seemingly less deferential regimes.212 The point about win rates, 
standing alone, is not necessarily meaningful. It could be that agencies 
are much more aggressive when they know Chevron deference will 
apply, so the lower win rate in Chevron cases simply reflects agencies’ 
greater aggressiveness in statutory interpretation in those cases in 
which they believe Chevron will apply. But those win rates, coupled 
with the finding that the Court often fails to apply Chevron at all in 
cases in which it is applicable, do seem to undercut the value of 
Chevron.213 
As an alternative to seeking Chevron deference to decisions 
made in adjudications, the PTO could seek indirect influence through 
the SG. According to Eskridge and Baer, Supreme Court cases 
frequently invoke arguments made by the SG, especially in technical 
 
 211. William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 
1125 (2008); see generally Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 
89 TEX. L. REV. 499 (2011) (discussing various agencies for which courts appear to have created 
agency-specific precedent). Richard Pildes, among others, has argued that differential judicial 
treatment of diverse agencies is normatively desirable. See Richard Pildes, Institutional 
Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 5. For purposes 
of this short contribution, we do not take a position on the normative question.  
 212. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 211, at 1142–43. 
 213. Indeed, if agencies cannot be confident that the Court will in fact find Chevron 
relevant, then they cannot be confidently aggressive in situations in which they think Chevron 
applies (because the Court might in fact not apply Chevron in such cases). If agencies 
understand the phenomenon Eskridge and Baer identify, we would not expect them to be much 
more aggressive when they thought Chevron applied, and thus the lower win rate in Chevron 
cases would in fact reflect a deeper weakness in Chevron. And, even if agencies have not 
internalized the phenomenon Eskridge and Baer identify, the inconsistent application of 
Chevron, standing alone, diminishes its value. 
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areas such as intellectual property.214 And win rates for the position 
articulated by the SG in patent cases specifically are impressive.215 As 
cases like Hyatt illustrate, however, the Court’s attachment to stare 
decisis (or at least purported stare decisis) may trump even the 
position of the SG.216 
CONCLUSION 
The APA was a move away from ad hoc applications of 
standards of review to consistent rules that would apply to all 
agencies. And Chevron was a move toward rigor and consistency; not 
only would agencies get more deference, but the law would be clear 
as to when they received deference and when they did not. As is often 
the case in law, the promise and the reality have been quite different. 
And that difference has been particularly great with respect to the 
PTO. 
In the AIA, Congress not only gave the PTO enhanced authority 
(to be implemented in the first instance by the PTAB) but also left in 
place a statutory scheme under which the PTO could make a strong 
case for Chevron deference. Yet the PTO has not pushed the levers it 
has available. 
Meanwhile, in Dickinson v. Zurko, the Supreme Court rebuked 
the Federal Circuit for failing to apply ordinary principles of 
administrative law to the PTO, but since then has often found that its 
precedents construing statutory language control, leaving no role for 
the APA or Chevron deference. More generally, empirical studies 
have found that the Court often fails to apply Chevron in cases in 
which it is applicable. 
In this Article we suggest that these phenomena are related—
that the PTO’s failure to push for deference may reflect a calculation 
that the benefits of such a push will be fairly low, because of 
uncertainty about the Court actually deferring in situations in which it 
seems appropriate. 
In the end, what appears to matter most is what the Court thinks 
it has already decided. One can be forgiven for concluding that we are 
operating under a regime in which the agency defers, and the Court 
decides. 
 
 214. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 211, at 1140 (coding seven out of seventeen intellectual 
property cases as involving “consultative deference” to the views of the SG).  
 215. See Duffy, supra note 184, at 538. 
 216. See supra notes 189–95 and accompanying text. 
